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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to study the theoretical and methodological
problems of changes in organizational routines. Previous research normally
centers on the exogenous changes that accompany changes in the environment, but
the focus has moved to the endogenous changes not premised on organizational
adaptation. However, in both debates, areas remain that still require theoretical
analysis. This research revisits the arguments of the Carnegie School, which
prompted research on organizational routines, and focuses on their implications
that previous research have been overlooked to study the theoretical and
methodological problems of both discussions.
Exogenous Change in Organizational Routines
Although organizational routines are now defined to be recurrent behavior
patterns, rules or procedures（Becker,2004）, narratives or linguistic representations
（Pentland & Feldman,2007）, dispositions（Becker,2008; Hodgson,2003; Hodgson
& Knudsen, 2004）, and generative systems（Pentland & Feldman, 2008）, the
concept initially signified the rules used by organizational members for decision-
making ; “decision premises” or “decision rules” would have been more appropriate.
The inaugurators of routine studies, scholars of the Carnegie School, understood
organizational routines to be rules used by humans limited by bounded rationality
to simplify the search process related to decision-making, notwithstanding the
differences in terminology they used, for example, “habit”（Simon, 1997）,
“performance programs”（March & Simon, 1958）, and “standard operating
procedures”（SOPs ; Cyert & March,1963）.
Organizational routines are rules used as premises in decision-making by
organizational members. But if the results of rule-based behaviors do not meet
expectations, they may be modified. To explain changes in routines, previous
research has typically assumed a hierarchical structure, in which high-level
（higher-order）routines change low-level（lower-order）ones.
For example, March and Simon（1958）understood performance programs as a
three-level structure in which the “regulations and procedures” were the lowest
programs for performing a task, the “switching rules that determine when it will
apply one program, and when another” were the mid-level programs, and the
highest level were the “procedures it uses for developing, elaborating, instituting,
and revising programs”（p.170）. Cyert and March（1963）understood a two-level
SOP structure of high-level（higher order）“general choice procedures” concerning
decisions-making at the company level and low-level（lower order） “specific
standard operating procedures” concerning daily operation level decision-making
（pp.101－104）. They thought that, if routine-based behaviors did not yield results
meeting satisfactory standards, the company could modify the low-level routines
following the high-level routines, or reconsider the high-level routines themselves.
Carrying on the intellectual tradition of the Carnegie School, Nelson
and Winter（1982）explained routine change using similar logic, but they paid
special attention to the search routines modifying high-level routines（pp.17－18）.
When modifying existing routines, the company searches for other routines. If a
substitute routine is found, the company creates a new routine, either by imitating
the newfound routine or by making a new combination with the existing routine.
In other words, change in high-level organizational routines is brought about by
even higher-level search routines.
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Studies about dynamic capabilities have tried to comprehensively explain an
organization’s ability to change its routines, including search routines. Dynamic
capabilities are defined as an organization’s “ability to integrate, build, and
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing
environments”（Teece, Pisano, & Shuen,1997, p.516）, or to the “learned and
stable pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically
generates and modifies its operating routines”（Zollo & Winter,2002, p.340）.
They can be thought of as high-order routines encouraging environmentally adaptive
changes in existing routines.
Thus, although previous research has invariably assumed the existence of
“meta-routines（routines for changing routines）”（Pentland, Feldman, Becker, &
Liu,2012, p.1501）, one question arises in this regard : even if change in low-level
routines could be explained by high-level meta-routines, how could change in meta-
routines be explained ? Logically, as meta-routines can bind unsuitable knowledge
into decision-processes（Leonard-Barton,1992）, there is a need to explain how
meta-data routines are changed. Of course, one can always hypothesize routines of
a yet higher level. However, change in those routines would also be questioned,
and an even higher concept would be needed. In other words, any attempt to
explain change in organizational routines through the premise of a hierarchy of
routines necessarily leads to an “infinite regress”（Hans,1985）, rendering the
problem logically insolvable.
The Carnegie School Revisited（1）
Organizational Routines as Institutions
The cause of this theoretical pitfall follows from the naïve assumption that
decision rules determine people’s behavior. Actually, Becker（2004）indicated that
research that defines organizational routines as behavior patterns has become
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the mainstream, because so much of it similarly assumes that rule content is directly
reflected in people’s behavior（p.664）. Gersick and Hackman（1990）placed the
Carnegie School’s conceptualization of organizational routines as behavior patterns
at the origin of routine studies（pp.68－69）, Pentland and Rueter（1994）placed
March and Simon（1958）and Nelson and Winter（1982）at the origin, with their
representative research on organizational routines using a stimulus-response model.
Furthermore, research on the problem of organizational rigidity stemming from
routines（e. g., Hannan & Freeman,1984; Whetten,1987）confirms that this naïve
assumption is pervasive.
However, this understanding of the relationship between rules and behavior
misses the real intention of the Carnegie School. As their account of that
relationship can appear be based on a stimulus-response model（e. g., Simon,1997,
pp.99－100; March & Simon,1958, pp.139－140; Cyert & March,1963, pp.33－
34）, some have criticized the Carnegie School’s concept of organizational routines
（e. g., Cohen,2009）. However, scholars of the Carnegie School pointed out that
the relationship between rules and behavior is not straightforward.
In fact, March and Simon（1958） asserted that their term “performance
programs” did not imply complete rigidity（p.142）, and Gavetti, Levinthal,
and Ocasio（2007） have also pointed out that Nelson and Winter（1982） did
not adequately grasp the implication that actions guided by performance programs
are flexible（p.526; p.534）. Furthermore, Cyert and March（1992） have,
interestingly, changed their view regarding the relationship between rules and
behavior. In contrast to the first edition of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
（1963）, in which they had explained that rules govern people’s behavior, they
emphasized in the epilogue added to the book’s second edition（1992）that rules
have a normative influence on the orientation of people’s behavior : rather than
being used to determine behavior, rules are used strategically when selecting among
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actions suitable to the situation at the time（pp.230－232）. Thus, the correct
understanding of the Carnegie School’s concept of decision rules is that they are
premises people reference when making decisions, which can result in a variety of
actions at the behavior level.
It should be noted that James G. March, who created both the conceptual model
for organizational routines and the original misunderstanding of it, brought attention
to the concept’s implications and defined this concept as “institutions”（March &
Olsen,1984,1989,2006）. The term “institutions” means a system of abstract
norms to which people refer before acting. In other words, notwithstanding that
organizational routines provide goals and templates for behavior, because they do
not instruct specific actions and therefore individual judgment and interpretation has
to be introduced in order to perform the task, variation in people’s practices is
possible.
Similarly, Feldman（2000,2003）and Feldman and Pentland（2003）formulated
the notion of organizational routines as dualities, differentiating between the norms
referred to at the time of acting and the practice as its result. Distinguishing
between a routine’s ostensive aspects（the abstract understanding of the work and
how it should be done）and its performative aspects（the actions taken at a specific
time and place）, Feldman and Pentland argued that understanding the performative
aspects was more important for routine studies.
Endogenous Change in Organizational Routines
After attention was directed to the performativity of an organizational routine,
some studies have emphasized that change from performative to ostensive aspects of
routines is endogenous to routines. For example, Becker, Knudsen and March
（2006） and March and Olsen（2006）describe how incremental change in the
routine occurs through a continuous process in which actors created new practices of
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the routine（Becker et al.,2006, pp.366－367; March & Olsen,2006, p.12）.
These arguments, in avoiding the problem of infinite regress that hobble
traditional arguments, provide a new explanatory framework for change in
organizational routines. However, it remains to be explained why variation in actor
practices should lead to change in the routine. These researchers seem to be
arguing that an increase in practice variation automatically leads to changes in
routine.
On the other hand, Feldman and Pentland（2003）and Pentland et al.（2012）
explain routine dynamics using an evolutionary theory model. Here, the ostensive
aspects of a routine changes as variation in its practice are selectively preserved.
According to these researchers, to change a routine（its ostensive aspects）,
managers or administrators must legitimize specific actions because they have been
given the role of selecting the specific actions and approving the actions for
integration into the routine（Feldman & Pentland,2003, pp.108－114; Pentland et
al.,2012, pp.1501－1503）.
Those researchers have refined the discussion by establishing a mediator－
control practices－between changes in the performative and ostensive aspects of
a routine. However, theoretically and practically reasons to explain routine（its
ostensive aspects）change remains to be demonstrated. This agenda for research is
the other side of the coin of the naïve assumption shared in traditional routine
studies that decision rules determine people’s behavior. Though the original
theoretical premise that routines have the performative aspects is confirmed, if this
agenda is being tackled, the reasons for arguing on change in the ostensive aspects
of routines need to be clarified. Similarly, although previous research may have
shown that managers or administrators change routines, it has not discovered why
they make those changes ; thus, the conventional research agenda is still blindly
being followed.
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The Carnegie School Revisited（2）
Design of Organizational Routines
Regarding this problem, it may be necessary to return to Herbert A. Simon’s
arguments that founded routine studies. According to Simon, because humans are
limited by their bounded rationality, they cannot optimize their decisions on what to
do to achieve organization’s goals. Because of this limitation, to align their
decision-making with the goals of the organization, it is necessary to limit the range
of alternatives by simplifying the psychological environment for individual decision-
making（Perrow,1972; Simon,1991,1997）. Specifically, Simon thought that,
as one factor making up the psychological environment, organizational routines, the
encoding of an organization’s past experiences, act as a management tool for
controlling individual behavior by limiting alternatives to those that contribute to the
attainment of the organization’s goals.
In the same way, Schulz（2008）pointed out that organizational routines have
the inherent functions, as discipline, of rationalizing individuals’ behavior and
making legitimate domination possible. Therefore, a difference should be made,
epistemologically, between “routines” and the “routinization of behavior,” since
whether people’s behaviors will conform to a routine depends on whether it has
disciplinary effects.
This point concerns the methodological implications for routine studies. Thus
far, description has been the core of routine studies. Researchers made efforts to
observe a phenomenon in detail and to describe it exactly, taking a scientific view
that should be referred to as descriptive theory. However, if one is interested in
organizational routines’ control functions and how they organize individual behaviors
in ways congruent with the organization’s goals, a different methodological approach
to routine studies may be more appropriate. In particular, it may be that routine
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studies should include, as part of their output, the development of satisficing
heuristics for management regarding how to design a routine’s ostensive aspects.
To that end, an orientation toward adding pragmatic value－that is, to help
practitioners make better decisions－would be needed, based on prescriptive theory
（Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky,1988; Argyris,2003）.
As a matter of fact, in The Sciences of the Artificial（1996）, Simon tried to
argue for prescriptive theory. While asserting the need to describe, following the
natural sciences, how the artifacts made by humans with bounded rationality
function, he also conceptualized how science should utilize the knowledge gained
from those descriptions to actively engage in artifact design. His book did not
examine the concept exhaustively, but it is worth noting that his seminal idea is
being developed as a new scientific method called “design science”（Lee,2007;
Jelinek, Romme, & Boland,2008; March & Storey,2008）. In contrast to
traditional science, which attempts to describe phenomena uniquely from an
objective viewpoint, design science is oriented toward intervention and prescribes
effective designs for artifacts（Lee,2007, p.49）.
When discussing the design of organizational routines, it is necessary to
pay attention to the objects of the design. Just as there are cases where an
organizational routine is codified, for example, in a manual, there are also cases
where it exists as customary practices or other mindsets adhered to by members of
the organization. In the latter case in particular, instead of being directly designed
by managers or administrators, it can only be designed indirectly through artificial
objects such as manuals.
Additionally, regardless of how detailed the design of a routine may be, the
practices at jobsites cannot be completely controlled. Realistically speaking, just as
it is impossible for managers or administrators to predict every action, unexpected
variations will occur. Therefore, because a design’s results will always be
92 松山大学論集 第30巻 第3号
incomplete, it needs to be approached with the understanding that design is an
ongoing process（Garud, Jain, & Tuertscher,2008）.
However, this doesn’t mean simply making the instructions in routines more
clear. Realistically, it is impossible to imagine in advance every possible scenario
and create of list of what to do in every situation. To achieve its goals,
organization might require a wide variety of actions by its members, and some cases
are better served when the relevant organizational routines are ambiguous（Blau,
1963, p.23）. In any event, one needs to evaluate how a routine’s degree of
abstraction relates to the relevant performative practice, while also taking into
consideration the organization’s goals and the worker’s situation.
Conclusion
In this study, I explored the theoretical and methodological issues of change
in organizational routines. Organizational routines should be understood as the
normative decision rules referenced at the time of acting ; and results in a variety
of actions at the behavior level. However, research that examines only the
performative aspects of routines is also insufficient. Because organizational routines
is fundamentally a means of controlling the practices of organizational members,
understanding change in organizational routines requires a discussion of how
managers or administrators design（and redesign） a routine’s ostensive aspects
taking into account actual jobsite performative practices.
By taking these implication into account, our research practices will take a
completely different approach from the conventional. Taking a prescriptive
approach make it possible to develop research practices that can contribute to
improving the design of organizational routines. To do so, however, will require
further study of possible design variations.
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